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ABSTRACT 
 Income differences are normally explained by theory in terms of marginal 
productivity. However, how can one explain salary enormous jump when a vice-president 
is promoted into a CEO position? It would be too naive for one to believe his/her 
productivity increased at the same rate as his/her salary. Differences in wage in terms of 
relative performance is what economists call tournament theory. What we normally see is 
that workers are underpaid when they enter a company, and then become overpaid after a 
promotion. The main point behind such theory is that beginners work hard in order to 
enjoy the fat paycheck later on. Hence, the large increase in a CEO’s salary covers all the 
effort he/she supplied when underpaid.  
Tournament theory has been tested and applied in many professional sports. This 
thesis will analyze the data gathered from the Association of Tennis Professionals 
website. Its focus will be on the outcomes of a tennis match. Six main hypotheses will be 
tested: (1) expected marginal payoffs is expected to increase at a linear or at an increasing 
rate up to the final round, and then have a distinct jump in the final match; (2) best 4 
players of a tournament (champion, finalist, and 2 semi-finalist) are expected to receive 
50% of total prize money; (3) the probability a player wins a match is expected to 
increase if he wins the first set. The effect of winning the first set is expected to be more 
important for lower ranked players; (4) upsets are more likely to occur in ATP 
tournaments (played in best of 3 sets) when compared to Grand Slam tournaments 
(played in best of 5 sets); (5) a change in spread level is expected to directly influence the 
outcome of a match. As spread level increases more wins coming from lower skilled 
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players is expected; (6) total prize money will not affect the outcome of a match but will 
change the entry in a tournament. Better players are expected to enter tournaments where 
total purse is higher; (7) The effect of outcome is expected to depend on players’ ranking 
level. Less competition is expected to be seen when ranking difference gets wider.  
The construction of marginal payoff in professional tennis tournaments does not 
follow the theory. Marginal payoffs do increase, but at a decreasing rate, and an even 
larger decrease in the final round. Also, marginal payoff became negative, sometimes. In 
most cases, top four players do not receive 50% of total purse, but around 43%.  
The probability a player wins a match does increase after he wins the first set. The 
effect of winning the first set was the same in percentage terms for both better and worse 
players; yet, in terms of ratio difference, first set is doubled important for worse players. 
Results from binomial distribution showed that upsets are more likely to occur in matches 
played in best of 3 sets when compared to matches played in best of 5 sets. An increase in 
amount of set played does give an advantage for the better player.  
Output from regressions on outcome show that a change in spread level will 
increase the number of upsets in a tournament, meaning that payoff seems to be more 
important for worse ranked players. Regression results on average rank weight pointed 
out that an increase in tournament total purse will increase the quality of the draw, which 
is consistent with theory. In terms of ranking, variables Top Ranking and Bottom 
Ranking explain results in outcome in a more efficient way, rather than variable Ranking 
Difference. Lastly, results lead to the conclusion that less competition is seen as 
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differences in ranking increase. Dominance does exist for the better player ranked in the 
top 10 when compared to the rest subgroups of better ranked players.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Literature on tournament theory is extremely robust with sports-related studies.
1
 
Most recent analyses’ focus was on testing the tournament model developed by Rosen 
(1986), where players adjust effort level in order to maximize their expected prize or 
expected utility.
2
 Rosen’s theory predicts that individuals are expected to work harder if 
spread becomes wider. However, can we say that Rosen’s theory is applied in the real 
world of professional men’s tennis?  
The amount of total prize money in professional tournaments is fixed, and 
determined ahead of time. Hence, players are aware of spread levels before entering a 
tournament. If a player’s effort level depends on the size of spread, as Rosen says, then 
one expects to see better players entering tournaments where spread is wider. Not only 
that but an increase in spread level ought to decrease the amount of upsets (when a higher 
seeded player loses to a lower seeded player (or unseeded) player). Theory predicts that 
differences in marginal payoff (discounted sum of the differences in spread) need to be 
increasing at an increasing rate, if players are risk averse, and have an even higher jump 
in the final match, in order to maintain players interested in winning. Rosen (1986) 
mentioned that 50% of total prize money is distributed to the top four players in a men’s 
professional tennis tournament, but is that still true?  Do we see all of these assumptions 
in the tour?  
                                                          
1
 See Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Green and Stokey (1983), Main, O’Reilly, and Wade (1993), Knoeber 
and Thurman (1994), Ivankovic (1995), and Lazear (1996)  
2
 See Melton and Zorn (2000), Lynch and Zax (2000), Maloney and Terkun (2002), Sunde (2003), Bentley 
and Maloney (2006), and Gilsdorf, and Sukhatme (2007) just to list a few. 
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In this thesis, I propose to answer these questions by looking at data on mens’ 
professional tennis tournaments. Perhaps, professional tennis tournaments are the best fit 
for tournament model since they are structured on a single elimination basis, where 
winners qualify to the next round and losers are out of competition. This thesis will also 
analyze descriptive statistics in mens’ professional tennis, for example, if there are more 
upsets in matches played best of 3 sets compared with matches played best of 5 sets, and 
how does winning probability changes after a player wins the first set. 
As Rosen points out, spread levels do exist and need to be correctly structured in 
order to keep a high level of players’ performance. This study is extremely important 
when maximizing utility level of a player, as tournament directors might want to balance 
players’ marginal benefit of moving into the next round (future prize) against players’ 
marginal cost of moving into the next round (effort level), in order to attract audience. 
The data I gathered is rich because I know outcome of matches, players’ ranking, total 
prize money of tournaments and their spread levels, surface in which match was played, 
and number of sets (if played best of 3 or 5).  
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Figure I: Percentage Average of Total Purse Distributed to Winners 
 
Figure 1, for example, shows the average percentage of total purse distributed to 
the top players in the ATP World Tour tournaments. Last round pay in mens’ 
professional tennis is similarly structured to the last round pay in professional golf 
(Senior PGA Tour), where instead of receiving an average of 18% of total purse winners 
in golf receive 19%.  
Part 2 will discuss review of literature. Part 3 provides information about the 
Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP). Part 4 describes dataset of the ATP World 
Tour. Part 5 will discuss hypotheses tested in this thesis. Part 6 will show results derived 
from assumptions in part 5. Part 7 grants the reader with concluding thoughts while parts 
8 and 9 present the appendix and bibliography of this study.  
   
   
 
 
 
 
82%
18%
Total Purse
Winners' Prize
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Tournament Theory 
 Twenty-four years ago, Rosen (1986) developed a model to explain the problem 
of structuring incentives when competitors are paid on the basis of rank or relative 
performance. Rosen investigated the incentive properties of prizes in sequential 
elimination tournaments, where rewards increase in each stage of play. Rosen mentioned 
that prize structure needs to promote “survival of the fittest” and “quality of play” in 
every stage of the competition. His design of the game (professional tennis) assumes that 
all tournaments start with 2N players and is followed by N matches. Champions’ purse is 
defined by
1W , finalists’ purse is defined by 2W . Purse of semi-finals is 3 ,W and so on up 
to the first round. The number of rounds left to be played is defined by s. All players who 
lost in match s stages where remained will get prize equal to 1sW  . Marginal Payoff of 
advancing a round was determined as ∆ 1s s sW W W   . Rosen mentioned that a player’s 
decision of how much effort to supply will depend on the benefit of higher effort against 
its costs. Let I be defined as ability level supplied by player of type i, and J defined as 
ability level supplied by player of type j. Both I and J take on m possible values, 1,2,…,m, 
with m ≤ 2N .Let six and sjx be the intensity of effort expended by players i and j in a 
match where s stages are left to be played, and let I  and J be the natural talents for the 
game. Then, the probability a player of type I will defeat a player of type J is:  
 ( , ) ( )/ ( ) ( )s I si I si J sjP I J h x h x h x    ,  (1) 
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where h(x) is increasing in x and h(0)≥0. A player will increase his winning probability 
by supplying a higher level of effort, given the talent and effort of the opponent and own 
talent. When both player supply same level of effort, winning probability will be: 
 ( , ) /( )s I I JP I J      (2) 
Equation (2) simply says that a player’s probability of winning is proportional to his 
ability relative to the sum of both players’ ability. A player’s decision of how much effort 
to supply in a match will depend on its benefit minus its cost. According to Rosen, there 
are two complications: (1) value of advancing a round depends on how the player 
assesses future effort; (2) current behavior will depend on future possible opponents. 
Hence, the fundamental equation for players’ strategies is 
 
1 1( , ) max[ ( , ) ( ) (1 ( , )) ( )]s s s s s siV I J P I J EV I P I J W cx      (3) 
where ( , )sV I J  is the value to a player of type I playing a match against a player of type J 
in the next round. The cost of effort supplied by players is c(x) where players choose sx  
to maximize sV . The expected value of eligibility in the next round is 1( )sEV I . When 
observing ( , )sV I J what we see is that players’ strategies consist of an equation that 
equals marginal benefit of advancing to next round 
1 1max ( , ) ( ) (1 ( , ))s s s sP I J EV I P I J W    minus marginal cost of supplying effort ( )sic x . 
Substituting the winning probability equation where both players supply same amount of 
effort (2) into the equation for players’ strategies (3), and differentiating with respect to 
intensity of effort ( )six yields the first order condition 
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2
1 1' /( ) [ ( ) ] ' 0I J j i I i J j s s ih h h h EV I W c          (4) 
where ih = ( )sih x , 'ih =d ( )sih x /d ( )six , etc. In equation (4) effort in controlled by the 
expected value of eligibility in the next round minus the prize earned if the match is lost
1 1( ( ) )s sEV I W  . The difference between the expected value of eligibility in the next 
round must be higher than the prize paid if player loses in current round, in order to keep 
the player interested into moving to the next round. 
 The second order condition is 
 ' [( '' / ' ) 2 ' /( )] '' 0.i i i I i I i J j iD c h h h h h c        (5) 
where player’s marginal cost of moving to the next round is increasing at a faster rate 
than his marginal benefits, causing D<0. For example, a weak player might just slack off 
against a strong one because he knows that even though he supplies his maximum level 
of effort, that it will not be enough to beat his opponent. Differentiating equation (4) with 
respect to the current opponent’s effort, 
 / {( ' / ) ' / ( }( ).i j j j j I i J j I i J jx x h h c D h h h h          (6) 
Player i’s best response will be to increase effort ( )jx when jx is small enough, but it will 
be to decrease effort when opponent’s effort is significantly large. In Figure II, when
i jx x players 1 and 2 are equally talented, hence, both of them will exert same amount 
of effort. On the other side, when i jx x  player 1 is better than player 2, which will 
cause player 2 to exert a higher level of effort at the beginning of the match, but after 
player 2 reaches his peak and sees he has no chances of winning the match, he will 
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completely decrease amount of effort; player 1 will increase amount of effort from the 
beginning of the match, at a lower rate when compared to player 2, and after player 1 
realizes he is the better player he will keep increasing effort at a decreasing rate. Note 
that player 1 will never reach his peak, meaning that he will play just well enough to win 
the match.  
Figure II: Pure Strategy Equilibra 
ix             STRONG p1 
          
               EQUALLY TALENTED p1   i jx x  
 
      EQUALLY TALENTED p2 
  
     
      i jx x  
    WEAK p2 
jx  
 
Elasticities from (6) can be defined as         
 
( ) '( ) / ( ),
( ) '( ) / ( ),
( ) ( ) / ( ).
x xh x h x
x xc x c x
x x x


  



 (7)  
where ( )h x is a function that translates effort into probability of winning, and ( )c x is a 
function that translates effort into the cost of winning. If the elasticity of response in 
probability of winning is higher than the elasticity of response in cost, players are 
expected to supply more effort, even though their utility level might go down. ( )x is 
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performance/cost ratio at the level of x. Performance/cost ratio here is defined as the 
slope of expected payback in effort to the slope of expected cost in effort at the level x.  
Applying Model for Equally Talented Players 
 Turning point occurs when equilibrium is i jx x  for equally talented players 
(P=1/2). If i jx x and ,I J  player I will face a weak opponent. However, if i jx x  
and 
,I J  then player I will face a strong player. When all players are equally talented
1( )sEV I  will equal 1sV  because players know they will face opponents of same skills, in 
all rounds. Assuming winning probability equal to 1/2, yields the effort level equation, 
which is the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost, when s matches are remained to 
be played: 
 1 1( )( '( )/ ( )/4 '( ).s s s s sV W h x h x c x    (8) 
Substituting elasticities found in (7) into (8): 
 1 1( ) ( ) / 4 ( ).s s s sV W x c x    (9) 
Substituting (9) into (2) and again using P=1/2: 
 
1 1 1
1 1
{(1/ 2)(1 ( ) / 2}( )
(1 ) ,
s s s s s
s s s s
V x V W W
V W

 
  
 
   
  
      (10) 
where,    (1/ 2)(1 ( ) / 2).s sx               
(11) 
Equation (10) is implying that for given prizes, players are better off by supplying more 
effort, even if their utility level decreases, because if they don’t supply more effort we 
would have a default. Rules must be balanced to control for actions that influence 
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outcome in an inefficient and unproductive way (competition will be destroyed if rules 
are not controlled)
3
. However, equation (10) will only hold if players have zero incentive 
to default from sx defined by (8). This entails, from (10), that the incentives of moving to 
the next round must be higher than zero. 1 1 1 1( ) 0,s s s s sV W V W       which means that 
s >0, or else, accepting a loss will be the better choice. There is no equilibrium if players 
have incentives to default a match. Assuming 0< s <1 for all s and that probability of 
advancing round s equal to loser’s pay in round s, will define equation (10) as the 
marginal payoff players receive by advancing a round: 
1 2( ... )s sV    ∆ 1 2( ... )sW   ∆ 2W ... s  ∆ 1s sW W  .          (12) 
 The incentive of keep winning in a tournament comes from marginal payoff, 
which is the prize a player will get plus the discounted sum in prize difference that might 
be achieved in future matches. Manipulating values in (12) gives the expression for the 
probabilities player I will face player J in the next round minus the prize earned if the 
match is lost 
1 1( ),s sV W  which controls performance incentives, from (9). The results 
can be written as 
1 1 1( ) ( ... )s s sV W     ∆ 1 2 1( ... )sW    ∆ 2W ...  ∆ .sW          (13) 
Constant performance will require that 1( )s sV W  is a constant, which Rosen calls k. 
Hence, the following derivation comes from equation (13)  
 (1 )k  ∆W=∆ sW for s=2, 3,…, N. (14) 
                                                          
3
 There will be no competition if all players decide to default. Moreover, players have incentives to use 
innovative techniques to increase their winning probability (steroids for instance), and that’s also why 
organizations’ like the ATP create rules to maintain the integrity, and competition of the sport. 
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Because the final match depends only on ∆
1W , from (14)  
 k ∆
1W =∆W/(1-β)> ∆W. (15) 
 From equation (15) Rosen concluded that prize distribution weights top prize 
money more greatly than the rest. It is clear that concentrating even more in the top purse 
creates incentives for performance to increase as the game proceeds through its stages 
(Rosen, 1986). If players are risk averse, difference in the final spread will need to be 
even larger, in order to keep players interested. Rosen also developed models for 
heterogeneous contestants with known talents, and heterogeneous contestants with talents 
unknown. When the scenario involves different players with known abilities Rosen 
expects to see a lower level of effort supplied by players. In other words, the larger the 
initial disadvantage of a player, the harder it will be for him, in terms of effort, to 
compensate his weakness. On the other side, a strong player knows about his initial 
advantages and is able to reduce effort level without excessively jeopardizing his chances 
of success. In terms of marginal payoff, a weak player will have an inferior level of 
marginal payoff, because his probability of winning a match is lower, when compared to 
a strong player. However, winning probabilities are expected to average out as the 
number of rounds remained to be played in a tournament decrease.  
When ability level of players is unknown it is in the interest of the better player to 
make his rivals believe his abilities are higher than it normally is, in order to induce a 
rival to supply less effort (he doesn’t believe he has a chance to win). For weak players, it 
is smart to make their rivals believe he is weaker than he normally is, in order to induce 
the rival to slack off. Marginal payoff for players with unknown abilities will be the same 
11 
 
prior the start of a match because one cannot predict a winning probability as all players 
will choose same strategy.  
Empirical Studies on Tournament Theory 
Many economists have conducted empirical studies to test Rosen’s work in 
different types of labor markets, with a particular focus on professional sports.  Eriksson 
(1999) tested the predictions of tournament theory using data set on Danish executives. 
His results pointed to the acceptation of tournament theory as he found that managers 
having important duties inside the firm did have a wider salary spread. DeVaro (2005) 
suggested that relative work performances determined promotions. Higher work 
performance will increase the chance of a worker getting promoted. He then estimated a 
structural model of promotion tournaments (based on worker performance, wage spread 
between promotions, and promotion as an endogenous variable) and accepted the 
predictions of tournament theory, where employers are motivated by larger spreads.  
Sunde (2003) conducted an empirical study on the real financial incentive on 
professional tennis players based on effort level, using data from last two rounds of 
Grand Slam and Masters Series tournaments. He found a significant positive relationship 
among spread level and amount of games won by a player in a match, and no financial 
incentive in terms of total purse. Melton and Zorn (2000) analyzed the influence of 
tournament participation on players’ incentive level on the Senior PGA Tour. The format 
in professional golf (Senior PGA Tour) ensures that all players signed in the tournament, 
where they value the cut, will receive a portion of total purse, regardless of their ranking. 
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Their results support the idea that larger prize level of tournaments improves players’ 
performance and incentives. 
  Coffey and Maloney (2006) compared tournament theory with pure selection 
model in horse and dog racing. Their findings show that not only the best fit was 
tournament theory, but that nearly two-thirds of the increased performance, based on 
effort level, was associated with higher prizes. Maloney and Terkun (2002) investigate 
prize structures among competing firms paying tournament wages in motorcycle racing. 
Their study argued that even though some researchers found that workers supply more 
effort when there is a wider spread, firms seem to recognize this. Hence, firms respond to 
workers’ reaction by offering higher expected wages through wider purses.  
Ivankovic (1995) answered three major issues in tennis tournaments: (1)does the 
level of marginal payoff matter regarding players’ amount of effort, (2)should the level of 
total purse determine who enters a tournament, and (3)is is true that players’ effort only 
depend on the marginal payoff, and not total purse. He found that marginal payoff was 
not structured as theory predicts. Marginal Payoff level increased at a decreasing rate and 
in the final round it became negative. However, he observed that as spread level was 
increased, player supplied a higher level of effort (time length of matches increased). On 
the other side, Ivankovic was able to accept the hypothesis that total purse influences 
entry in a tournament. As the level of purse increases, better players are more likely to 
entry tournament. There was no confidence in saying that purse level does not affect 
effort supplied by players as he got mixed results.  
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The Binominal Distribution 
The binomial distribution is the discrete probability distribution of the number of 
successes in a sequence of n opportunities with probability of success equals to p. The 
discussion about the binomial distribution is useful to this thesis because in hypothesis 4 I 
will be testing if upsets are more likely to occur in ATP tournaments (played in best of 3 
sets) when compared to Grand Slam tournaments (played in best of 5 sets). Applying the 
binomial distribution to my hypothesis yields the following formula: 
 /p X n  = number of sets won/ number of sets in match (16) 
 since, the variance of p [ ( ) (1 )/V p P P N  ] decreases as n increases there will be less 
variance in outcome. In other words, an increase in the number of sets played is expected 
to increase the probability that the better player will win the match.  
Study of Binomial Distribution in Professional Tennis 
Dinterman (2009) tested the null hypothesis that there is a difference in the 
frequency of upsets in matches when played best of 3 sets verses matches played best of 
5 sets. His dataset included all matches played in Grand Slam tournaments from 2001 
until 2008, and all matches played in seven major ATP tournaments from 2001 until 2008. 
Upset was defined as higher seeded player losing to a lower seeded player (or unseeded) 
player. His results showed a higher frequency of upsets in tournaments played in 3 sets 
than in tournaments played in 5 sets.      
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ATP 
The empirical study of this thesis was based on the data set gathered from the 
Association of Tennis Professionals’ (ATP) website. The Americas headquarters of the 
ATP is in Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida, while ATP Europe is located in Monaco. ATP 
International is based in Sydney, and it covers Africa, Asia, and Australia. The ATP 
Executive Offices are in London. Data located on the ATP website include current and 
past rankings, prize money, live scores, daily scores, draws, results archive, service game 
leaders, return of services leaders, first serve points won, second serve points won, 
service games won, break points saved, head-to-head competition, tournament history, 
singles and doubles activity by player, and match statistics. All the data used in this study 
were collected from the ATP website.  
The ATP was formed in 1972, and its main purpose is to protect the interest of 
male professional tennis players. After January 2009 the ATP was renamed, and is now 
knows as the ATP World Tour. Jack Kramer and Cliff Drysdale first managed the ATP 
organization. In 1991, the ATP had its first TV Broadcasting package that included 19 
tournaments. Their first website was created in 1995, and it was rapidly boosted by a 
contract with Mercedes-Benz. In 2008, the ATP tour was restructured after facing couple 
lawsuits.  
The ATP Tour embraces six different types of tournaments: Grand Slams, ATP Tour 
Masters 1000, ATP World Tour 500 Series, ATP World Tour 250 Series, ATP 
Challenger Series, and Futures Tournaments. In this thesis only four types are being 
observed and tested: Grand Slams, Masters 1000, 500 and 250 Series. The ATP also runs 
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the World Team Cup, seeded by Düsseldorf every May, and the ATP Champions Tour 
for seniors. At the end of every season the ATP and the ITF organize the Tennis Masters 
Cup, which includes only the best eight (singles and doubles) players in the world.  
The Grand Slams are the strongest tournaments played on the ATP Tour. Only 
four of them are played each year (Australian Open, Roland Garros, Wimbledon, and the 
US Open). The Masters 1000 is the second strongest division of tournaments played on 
the ATP Tour. There are nine tournaments played every year (Indian Wells, Miami, 
Monte Carlo, Rome, Madrid, Montreal, Cincinnati, Shanghai, and Paris. The Tour Finals 
is played in London. The 500 Series is the third highest-level tournaments played on the 
ATP Tour. There are eleven events of this port and they are played in Rotterdam, Dubai, 
Acapulco, Memphis, Barcelona, Hamburg, Washington, Beijing, Tokyo, Basel, and 
Valencia. In 2009, the Davis Cup World Group and the World Group Playoffs began to 
award a total of 500 points to players.  The 250 Series is the lowest tier of tournaments 
played on the ATP Tour. The series includes forty tournaments that take place in all 
continents of the world.  
The ATP updates both of its rankings, Entry ranking and Race ranking, every 
week. The entry ranking determines qualification for entry and seeding in all tournaments 
for both singles, and doubles that accumulates from year to year. ATP Race ranking was 
an annual race from beginning of a season to the end of a season but was removed in the 
beginning of 2009.  
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DATA SET 
All the data set were gathered by the author through the Association of Tennis 
Professionals’ website (ATP). The data consists of observations on individual matches in 
129 professional tennis tournaments played on the ATP Tour during the years of 2008 
and 2009. Tournaments differ in year; draw size based on the number of players 
participating, and rounds based on the number of matches left to be played. Year is 
defined as matches played on 2008 or 2009. There are seven different draw sizes 28 draw, 
32 draw, 48 draw, 56 draw, 64 draw, 96 draw, and 128 draw. The 96 draw is the typical 
draw size for the Masters Series tournaments, and the 128 draw is normally the four 
Grand Slam tournaments. The draw not only lists each player’s names and the opponent’s 
name but it also shows possible opponents a player might face each round up to the final 
match. 
There are 18 28-draws, 78 32-draws, 8 48-draws, 15 56-draws, 1 64-draw, 4 96-
draws, and 8 128-draws. Overall, there are 5, 280 observations on individual matches in 
129 tournaments. The data set is divided in two groups. First group is the Tournament 
Data Set, which includes all the significant information regarding a tennis match. Second 
group is the Marginal Payoff and Prize Money Data Set, and it contains tournament 
financial information.  
The Tournament Data Set variables are: TOURNAMENT (a number given for 
each number, the maximum is 129), TOURNAMENT NAME (name of tournament given 
by the ATP), YEAR (what year tournament was played), SETS (1 if played best of 5 sets 
and 0 if played best of 3 sets), ROUND (sequence of matches played, from 1 to 7), 
17 
 
DRAW (the draw format the tournament follows, it can either be 28, 32, 48, 56, 96, or 
128), TOP RANKING (top ranked player’s ranking when the match was played, 
according to the ATP), BOTTOM RANKING (bottom ranked player’s ranking when the 
match was played, according to the ATP), TOP RANKED PLAYER (top ranked player’s 
name), BOTTOM RANKED PLAYER (bottom ranked player’s name), FIRST SET 
WINNER (1 if top player won the first set, 0 if bottom player won the first set, and 3 if 
first set was incomplete), OUTCOME (1 if top player won the match and 0 if bottom 
player won the match), SURFACE (1 if played on hard court, 2 if played on clay court, 3 
if played on grass court, and 4 if played on carpet court), RANK DIFF (absolute value of 
difference between two players ranking), RANK WEIGHT (sum of all players ranking in 
a determined tournament), and AVERAGE RANK WEIGHT (division of rank weight by 
draw size).   
Quite a few variables were created for empirical purposes. Variable RANK DIFF 
was created in order to measure top player’s ability with respect to bottom player’s ability. 
RANK WEIGHT was generated in order to measure players level in a tournament; the 
higher the number, the lower the level. AVERAGE RANK WEIGHT was calculated in 
order to measure tournament level, since we divide sum of player’s ranking by the draw 
size; again, the higher the number, the lower the level.  
The second group of Data Set, Marginal Payoff and Prize Money Data Set 
consists of: TOURNAMENT (a number given for each number, the maximum is 129), 
YEAR (what year tournament was played), PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN (the 
distribution of the monetary prize awarded to players in a tournament based on round), 
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POINTS (number of points awarded to players in a tournament based on round), ROUND 
(sequence of matches played, from 1 to 7), MARGINAL PAYOFF (discounted sum of 
the differences in spread) TOTAL PRIZE MONEY SINGLES (total prize money 
available to the singles tournament), and WINNERS PRIZE MONEY (total prize money 
given to the champion of the tournament).  
Most variables in the second group of the Data Set were created for empirical 
purposes. MARGINAL PAYOFF is a variable representing the discounted sum of the 
differences between two prizes based on ROUND. When calculating players’ winning 
probabilities for MARGINAL PAYOFF I decided to go with Rosen’s approach and 
assign a probability of 1/2 to each player in all rounds. Hence, MARGINAL PAYOFF for 
the first round in a 32 draw tournament is derived as: (p2-p1)+(p3-p2)*0.5+(p4-
p3)*0.5^2+(p5-p4)*0.5^3+(p6-p5)*0.5^4, where pi stands for prize money in round i. 
MARGINAL PAYOFF for the second round in the same draw size is: (p3-p2)+(p4-
p3)*0.5+(p5-p4)*0.5^2+(p6-p5)*0.5^3. Remaining MARGINAL PAYOFFS can be 
calculated similarly.  Because total purse normally includes doubles prize money, and 
since this study is only analyzing singles matches, I have decided to create the variable 
TOTAL PRIZE MONEY SINGLES, which can be calculated as: 
(16*p1)+(8*p2)+(4*p3)+(2*p4)+(1*p5)+(1*p6). This is the total prize money for a 32-
draw size tournament, where pi stands for prize money in round i.  
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HYPOTHESES 
Tournament theory, examined by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and later by Rosen 
(1986), has been used to describe certain situations where differences in wage are not 
based on the marginal productivity of an individual but instead based upon relative 
differences between those. Many economists used Rosen’s theory to explain why people 
like Jeffrey Immelt and Warren Buffet are “overpaid”.  It might be because Immelt and 
Buffet are not paid for the work they do but, rather, to inspire workers in their firm. In 
other words, “normal” employees suffer in “underpaying” jobs hoping that one day they 
will become “overpaid” CEOs like Immelt and Buffet. That’s what we call tournament 
theory. Promotion on the professional tennis tour is similar to the one in the office as 
great players are promoted, and less capable players are not. Roger Federer, for instance, 
is not paid to try his best, or to play perfect tennis, but he is paid to beat the rest of the 
players in the tour (which might be enough to get Federer’s best out of him, most of the 
times).  
When applying Rosen’s theory to professional tennis, one is expected to see an 
increase in effort level as spread level between two prizes increases. However, one has to 
be sensitive with “how large” of an increase, since the bigger the spread, more effort will 
be required, which means higher marginal cost supplied by players. Hence, there must be 
an equilibrium level to be found in the spread difference. Not only that, but tournament 
organizers ought to know that more skilled players will choose to play tournament where 
spread level is wider. Rosen points out that the level of effort will be directly affected by 
differences in spread level. Ivankovic (1995) tested such hypothesis and found it to be 
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true. As spread level increases players effort level will increase as well. However, it is 
important to make a difference between total prize money (total purse) and prize money 
breakdown (spread level). Total prize money might not affect effort level 
straightforwardly, if spread level is badly distributed for instance. Rosen also points out 
that 50% of total prize money is awarded to the last four players in a tournament. 
Ivankovic also tested such theory and found out that most tournaments offer around 40% 
of total prize money to the last four players.  
I have structured my hypotheses based on Rosen’s tournament theory, and 
Ivankovic’s and Dinterman’s empirical studies. Hence, the goal of this thesis is to test the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 
Marginal Payoff (spread) is expected to increase at a linear or at an 
increasing rate up to the final round, and then have a distinct jump in the final 
match. Spread difference in the final round is expected to be the highest when 
compared to earlier rounds.  
Hypothesis 2 
Best 4 players of a tournament (champion, finalist, and 2 semi-finalists) 
are expected to receive 50% of total prize money. 
Hypothesis 3 
The probability a player wins a match increases if he wins the first set. I 
expect to see the effect of winning first set being more important to lower ranked 
players.  
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 Hypothesis 4 
 Upsets (when the lower ranked player wins the match) are more likely to 
occur in ATP tournaments (played in best of 3 sets) when compared to Grand 
Slam tournaments (played in best of 5 sets). An increase in number of sets played 
will increase the probability for the better player to win a match.  
Hypothesis 5 
A change in spread level is expected to directly influence the outcome of a 
match. As spread level increases I expect to see more wins coming from lower 
skilled players. 
Hypothesis 6 
Total prize money will not affect outcome of a match but entry in a 
tournament. I expect to see better players entering tournaments where total purse 
is higher.  
Hypothesis 7 
I expect to see that the effect of outcome depends on players’ ranking 
levels. Less competition is expected to be seen when ranking difference gets 
wider.  
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The dataset contains observations on 5,279 matches in 129 tournaments played in 
the 2007-2009 period. Table I provides the reader with tournament statistics on means, 
standard deviations, minimum, and maximum values of all variables used in the 
regressions. 
 
Table I. Means, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum values for regression 
variables. (n= 5,279) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tournament 77.19 40.36 1 129 
Year 2008.45 0.53 2007 2009 
Sets 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Round 1.93 1.16 1 7 
Draw 57.65 37.19 28 128 
Match 19.16 17.16 1 64 
Top Ranking 38.59 36.75 1 557 
Bottom Ranking 116.66 167.52 2 2000 
First Set Winner 0.83 0.46 0 1 
Outcome 0.67 0.46 0 1 
Surface 1.55 0.71 1 4 
Rank Difference 78.05 157.04 0 1999 
Rank Weight 7874.59 4903.08 1869 18797 
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Average Ranking Weight 149.41 60.02 45.25 361.42 
Prize Money Breakdown 21956.25 41122.44 1000 800000 
Points 38.01 75.86 0 1200 
Marginal Payoff 61789.85 81530.04 8836.17 850000 
Total Prize Money Singles 2058177 2429653 272280 7547580 
Winners Prize Money 443060.7 475142.1 64000 1600000 
Maximum Rounds 5.642167 0.78 5 7 
Final 0.024 0.15 0 1 
Semi Final 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Quarter Final 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Top 16 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Top 32 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Top 64 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Top 128 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Hard Court 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Clay Court 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Grass Court 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Carpet Court 0.005 0.07 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
  
The spread level or marginal payoff was obtained through Rosen’s derivation. 
According to Rosen, the incentive to win a round is determined by the discounted sum of 
differences in prize money breakdown. As Ivankovic mentioned in his thesis, marginal 
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payoff = (expected price due to advancement – loser’s pay). One important thing about 
marginal payoff is the winning probability assigned to each player in each round. I have 
set same probabilities to all players (1/2) for all rounds but we know that 150
th
 ranked 
player has less than 1/2 probability of beating Rafael Nadal for instance, who is currently 
3
rd
 in the world. Assuming 1/2 probability for all matches might produce biased 
coefficients for marginal payoff in the first rounds, but as the number of rounds to be 
played in a tournament decrease, probability is expected to converge to ½. Further 
research in how to set winning probabilities might be useful for in this case.  
 Variables that influence the outcome of a match, from Table I, ought to be 
mentioned.  SETS ranges from 0 to 1, being 0 if played best of 3 sets and 1 if played best 
of 5 sets. Its mean is 0.19, which tells us that players played more matches determined in 
best of 3 sets during the 2008 and 2009 seasons. Variable TOP RANKING ranges from 1 
to 557, with a mean of 38. This is interesting because even though the maximum value 
for TOP RANKING is considered to be a very low professional ranking (557), one can 
see that TOP RANKING values were quite close to its mean (standard deviation is about 
36), indicating that not many TOP RANKING players had really low rankings, which can 
be explained by the fact that two qualifiers might play each other in the first round. When 
looking at BOTTOM RANKING one can observe a mean of 116, minimum of 2, and 
maximum of 2000. Most of players that received a WC, an invitation to participate in a 
tournament, were not ranked within the ATP norms. For those players, I decided to give a 
ranking equal 2000, so one I am able to differ them from the rest. When doing a 
descriptive statistics of BOTTOM RANKING excluding all rankings equal 2000, I see 
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that the maximum value for BOTTOM RANKING will equal 1734, which is not much 
different than 2000. We also observe that about 15 players did not possess an ATP 
ranking in this data set. Standard deviation for BOTTOM RANKING is equal to 167, 
which means that BOTTOM RANKING is more spread out over a large range of values 
when compared to TOP RANKING.   
 Variable SURFACE was divided into four different categories: 1 if surface is hard 
court, 2 if clay court, 3 if grass court, and 4 if carpet. From Table 1, one can see that most 
tournaments during 2008 and 2009 were played on hard court surface (about 57%). The 
next most played surface was clay court (30%) followed by grass court (11%). The 
remaining 2% of matches were played on carpet court surface. TOTAL PRIZE MONEY 
SINGLES has a mean of $2,058.177. Minimum purse distributed in a tournament equaled  
$272,280 and maximum purse distributed was $7,547,580. On the other side, 
MARGINAL PAYOFF has a mean equal to $61,789.85. Lowest level of spread offered 
in a tournament was $8,836.17 and highest level of spread offered was $850,000.   
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Test of Hypothesis 1 
Figures III through VIII provide graphs for MARGINAL PAYOFF levels and 
PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN levels, where ROUNDS is the number of rounds played 
in a tournament. There are five rounds in a tournament that consists of 28, and 32 players, 
six rounds in a 48, 56, and 96 players tournament, and seven rounds for a 128 players 
tournament.  
As we move towards the final round the levels of MARGINAL PAYOFF and 
PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN are expected to increase, at a linear or increasing rate, 
as the amount of rounds left to be played in a tournament decreases; however, in the final 
round, levels of MARGINAL PAYOFF are expected to have a distinct jump. According 
to Ivankovic (1995), theory suggests that the amount of increase in spread will depend on 
risk preference adopted by players. A risk neutral player will be satisfied with a constant 
spread up to the semi-final match, while in the final a larger increase in spread is required. 
If the player is risk averse, then spread needs to be increasing at an increasing rate with 
an even larger difference in spread between the champion and finalist. Spread needs to be 
increasing in order to maintain risk averse players interested in entering the tournament.  
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Figure III: Mean Leves for MARGINAL PAYOFF when i=ROUND and DRAW= 28 
and 32 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
 
Figure IV: Mean levels for MARGINAL PAYOFF when i=ROUND and DRAW=49, 56, 
96, AND 128  
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Figure V: Mean Leves for MARGINAL PAYOFF when i=ROUND and DRAW=28, 32, 
48, 56, 96, and 128  
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
 
Figure VI: Mean Levels for PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN when i=PRIZE and 
DRAW=28 and 32 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Figure VII: Mean Levels for PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN when i= PRIZE and 
DRAW= 48, 56, 96, and 128 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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spread levels is decreasing). In all draws we see a distinct fall in marginal payoff in the 
final round, but in the 28 and 128 draw format we actually observe a negative number, 
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format, which shows a large increase of prize money in round 5 and an even larger 
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of the four 48 draw tournaments distributed only six prizes money, meaning that two 
tournaments were played in a total of five rounds instead of six. To test if such 
assumption is true I decided to separate prize money differences by year, round, and 
match. The results can be seen on figure VIII.   
 
Figure VIII: Mean Levels for PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN when i=ROUND, 
DRAW=48 and YEAR=2008, DRAW=48 and YEAR=2009, and DRAW=56, 96, and 
128 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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tournaments played in 2009.
 4
 Overall, we are able to conclude that PRIZE MONEY 
BREAKDOWN increases at a relatively constant rate, and it seems to have a small 
increase in the last round.  
From above all graphs, MARGINAL PAYOFF results for 28 and 128 draw 
tournaments increases at a decreasing rate up to the final match, and then it drops. 
MARGINAL PAYOFF will also increase at a decreasing rate for all other types of 
tournaments, but it will not become negative in the last round, as it will increase at a 
much lower rate, almost equal to zero at times.  
Changes in PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN are rather linear across rounds for 
all types of tournaments. Observing the level of PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN in the 
last round it is obvious to see that there is no distinct jump, it actually has a very small 
increase.   
 From the above graphs and tables located in the appendix, most results lead 
towards the rejection of the first hypothesis. Ivankovic (1995) measured same hypothesis 
and found similar results. Comparing my results with his, the only notable difference is 
that Ivankovic found that MARGINAL PAYOFF drops and it actually becomes negative, 
in the last round, for all types of tournaments. I can conclude that the structure of the 
distribution of prize money in professional tennis tournaments does not follow the theory; 
however it seems to be changing in a way that favors tournament model.  
  
                                                          
4
 See Appendix for more details. 
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Test of Hypothesis 2 
 Hypothesis 2 will address the assumption that top four players in a tournament 
(champion, finalist, and two semi-finalist) receive 50% of total prize money. Second 
hypothesis supports the idea that spread level is expected to increase at a linear or 
increasing rate as the number of rounds to be played in a tournament decrease (hypothesis 
1).  
 I observed three different levels of prize distribution (champion, finalist, and 
semi-finalist) and compared them with total prize money distributed in the tournament. 
Total prize money is only measured for the singles tournament because that’s the only 
data I am examining. Table IX summarizes the results found. 
 
 Table XVII. Means, TOTAL PRIZE MONEY SINGLES, and % OF TOTAL PRIZE 
MONEY SINGLES, where DRAW = 28, 32, 48, 56, 96, and 128. 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
Winner Prize 28 93417.08 Winner Prize 32 137868.2 
Finalist Prize 28 49594.31 Finalist Prize 32 69513.87 
Semi Prize 28 26731.22 Semi Prize 32 35490.24 
Total Purse 28 387473.3 Total Purse 32 538041 
% Total Purse 43.8 % Total Purse 45.140112 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
Winner Prize 48 353693.3 Winner Prize 56 448335.7 
Finalist Prize 48 319522.9 Finalist Prize 56 219708.8 
Semi Prize 48 74030.71 Semi Prize 56 111036.7 
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Total Purse 48 1485727 Total Purse 56 1850889 
% Total Purse 50.29 % Total Purse 42.09 
Variable Mean     Variable Mean 
Winner Prize 96 600333.3 Winner Prize 128 1332735 
Finalist Prize 96 295333.3 Finalist Prize 128 671430 
Semi Prize 96 180300 Semi Prize 128 322590 
Total Purse 96 2321013 Total Purse 128 6773250 
% Total Purse 46.35 % Total Purse 34.35 
 Avg. % Total Purse 43.67  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
 From table XVII we can easily see only the 48 draw format distributes 50% of 
total purse to the top four players. One can observe that most tournaments organized by 
the ATP do distribute almost half of total purse to the top four players (with an exception 
of Grand Slams), with an average distribution of total purse equal to 43.67%. It is 
interesting to see that in the 128 draw tournaments the top four players receive much less 
in terms of percentage (total purse) when compared to the rest of draws. An explanation 
could be that Grand Slam tournaments have a lot more players in the draw and that there 
is no need to create a larger incentive for the last four players to win their matches since 
they are in the most important tournaments played on the ATP, and every player on the 
tour dreams about winning a title.  
 Ivankovic tested same hypothesis on his work and found that most tournaments 
offer around 40% of the total purse to the top four players. He also pointed out that Grand 
34 
 
Slam tournaments offered an even lower percentage amount, which in his study equaled 
31.95%. Thus, I can conclude that, again, the professional tennis tour is not applying 
Rosen’s theory when organizing tournaments. Thus, results lead me to reject hypothesis 2. 
However, I can also conclude that in the past two seasons (2008 and 2009) tournaments 
have been structured in a different way when compared to 1995, and now it seems that 
the ATP Tour is moving its prize distribution towards Rosen’s theory. 
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Test of Hypothesis 3 
 In hypothesis 3 I will test if the probability of winning a match increases after a 
player wins the first set. I expect to see the effect of winning the first set being more 
important to lower ranked players. Tables XVIII-XV will provide results. 
 
Table XVIII. Percentages for FIRST SET WINNERi, and OUTCOMEi, where i=0 or 1.  
First Set Winner Outcome Percentage 
1 0 30.62 
1 1 69.38 
0 0 39.32 
0 1 60.68 
Note: FIRST SET WINNER=1 means that better player won the first set, and 0 that better 
player lost the first set. OUTCOME=1 means that better player won the match, and 0 that 
better player lost the match. 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
Table XIX. Percentages for FIRST SET WINNERi where i=0 or 1. 
First Set Winner Percentage 
0 19.09 
1 79.64 
Note: FIRST SET WINNER=1 means that better player won the first set, and 0 that better 
player lost the first set.  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Table XX. Percentages for OUTCOMEi where i=0 or 1. 
Outcome Percentage 
0 32.59 
1 67.41 
Note: OUTCOME=1 means that better player won the match, and 0 that better player lost 
the match. 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
 From Table XVIII I observe the following:  
 30.62% of times the better player won the first set but lost the match. 
 69.38% of times the better player won the first set and also won the 
match. 
 39.32% of times the better player lost the first set and also lost the 
match. 
 60.68% of times the better player lost the first set but still won the 
match.  
With that, I can conclude that if the worse player wins the first set, his chances of 
winning the match increase by 8.7%, which will be the same percentage for the better 
player. From table XIX I see that the worse player won the first set 19.09% of times, and 
that the better player won the first set 79.64% of times. From table XX I conclude that 
only 32.59% of matches were won by worse players versus 67.41% of matches won by 
better players. Finally, I am able to accept the hypothesis that winning probability goes 
up after a player wins the first set. However, I am not able to conclude that the first set is 
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more important for worse players. Although, I can argue that going from 30.6% to 39.3% 
is a 1/3 improvement, while going from 60.7% to 69.4% is only a 1/6 improvement.   
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Regression Results 
Tests of Hypotheses 4 and 5 
 Assume A and B are individuals trying to hit one serve at a target on the tennis 
court. With that being said, we all ought to agree both of them have only one chance to 
hit the target. Now, assume individual A has comparative advantage in serving when 
compared to individual B. Increasing the number of serves will increase the chances of 
both individuals hitting the target, meaning that the probability of hitting a target with 
one chance is lower than if there were two chances, for instance. However, the point here 
is that as I increase the number of chances given to both individuals I expect to see 
individual A hit the target more times than individual B. Thus, the assumption behind this 
idea is that winning probability of individual A, regarding the serve contests, is expected 
to increase every time I give both players an extra chance to hit the target.  
Hypothesis 4 will test if upsets (when the lower ranked player wins the match) are 
more likely to occur in ATP tournaments (played in best of 3 sets) when compared to 
Grand Slam tournaments (played in best of 5 sets). An increase in number of sets played 
is expected to increase the probability for the better player to win a match.  
Hypothesis 5 will analyze the effects of spread on outcome. An increase in spread 
level is expected to directly influence the outcome of a match (I expect to see more wins 
coming from lower skilled players because I believe tournament prize money is their 
primary source of income). 
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 I estimated the effects of SETS and MARGINAL PAYOFF on the dependent 
variable OUTCOME. Hence, I constructed the following regression: 
 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8 9
arg 10
tb i i i
i i i
i i i tb
Outcome TopRanking BottomRanking ClayCourt
GrassCourt CarpetCourt M inalPayoff k
Sets TopRankingGS BottomRankingGS
   
  
   
   
  
   
 (17) 
tbOutcome is the result of a match i played between t (top) and b (bottom) players. 
iTopRanking is the ranking of better player when match i was played. iBottomRanking is 
the ranking of worse player when match i was played. iClayCourt stands for the type of 
surface match i was played, which is 1 if clay and 0 otherwise.
iGrassCourt  also stands 
for the type of surface match i was played, which is 1 if grass and 0 oherwise.
iCarpetCourt is surface that match i was played, which is 1 for carpet and 0 otherwise. 
The omitted surface variable is hard court. Variable arg 10iM inalPayoff k is the marginal 
prize given for advancing to the next round in a match i, iSets is the format match i was 
played, either best of 3 sets of best 5 sets. iSets takes on dummy variables of 1 if played 
best of 5 sets, and 0 if played best of 3 sets. iTopRankingGS  is the ranking of better when 
match i was played in Grand Slams. 
iBottomRankingGS is the ranking of worse player 
when match i was played in Grand Slams. Let’s focus on results in table XXI. 
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Table XXI. Marginal effects after logit regression on SETS and MARGINAL PAYOFF 
for the 2007-09 ATP Tour. Dependent variable= OUTCOME. Absolute z values in 
parenthesis.  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
Table XXI represents marginal effects after a logit regression from equation (17). 
An increase in top players’ ranking (actually a decrease in variable Top Ranking because 
lower number means better ranking) will increase the amount of matches defeated. On 
the other side, a decrease in bottom players’ ranking (actually an increase in variable 
Bottom Ranking) will decrease the amount of upsets. For example, the value of .011 
shows that a defeat is 1% more likely to happen if a match is played on clay court, than to 
a match played on hard court. It also shows that a defeat is 1.5% more likely to happen if 
a match is played on grass court compared to a match played on hard court. On the other 
Variable (1) 
Top Ranking -.0023286         (9.97) 
Bottom Ranking .0004775          (6.56) 
Clay Court .0115025          (0.80) 
Grass Court .0153684          (0.71) 
Carpet Court -.0898073         (1.01) 
Marginal Payoff 10k -.0020323         (2.06) 
Sets .0827337          (2.67) 
Top Ranking Grand Slam -.0024583         (3.89) 
Bottom Ranking Grand Slam .0008218          (2.54) 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable 
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side, it yields that an upset is 8.9% more likely to happen if a match is played on carpet 
court, when compared to a match played on hard court. 
Matches played in best of 3 sets do have a higher frequency of upsets, about 8% 
more, compared to matches played best of 5 sets. Hence, I am able to accept hypothesis 4, 
which assumed that an increase in number of sets played, would increase the probability 
for the better player to win a match.  
As marginal payoff level increases, the number of upsets increases as well. An 
increase of $10,000 in marginal payoff will increase the frequency of upsets by .2%, 
which is very small. Perhaps a more significant result would be an increase of $100,000 
in marginal payoff, which would increase upsets by 2%. Still, I am able to accept 
hypothesis 5, where an increase in spread level is associated with an increase in the 
number of upsets. A speculation to explain such result is that better players’ primary 
source of income must come from sponsors, or somewhere else, but not come from 
tournaments’ total purse. On the other side, perhaps an interesting topic for investigation 
is whether or not worse players’ primary source of income comes from tournaments’ total 
purse.  
Last observation from table XXI yields that an increase in grand slams players’ 
ranking will increase their number of wins.  On the other side, a decrease in grand slams 
players’ ranking will decrease their number of wins.  
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Test of Hypothesis 6 
Hypothesis 6 will test the effect of total prize money on the entry level of a 
tournament. Theory suggests that total purse will have a positive relationship with 
ranking (better players are more likely to enter tournaments with higher purse 
levels).Hence, I expect to see that an increase in purse will increase quality of play in a 
tournament.  
Table XXII. Effect of total purse on entry into tournaments for the 2007-09 ATP Tour. 
Dependent variable= AVERAGE RANK WEIGHT. Absolute t-statistics in parenthesis.  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
 Results on table XXII show that t statistics on total purse (4.37) is significant. 
Also, the coefficient for total purse is negative, which implies an opposite relationship 
with average rank weight. In other words, as the level of total purse increases, the level of 
players, in terms of ranking, entering a tournament increases. It is important to clarify, for 
uninformed readers, that higher average rank weight means lower quality of play. An 
increase of $10,000 in total prize money will decrease average rank weight by around 14 
spots in the ATP ranking list, which is very significant. Finally, I conclude that 
tournament theory does predict, correctly, entry into an ATP Tour tournament.  
Variable (1) 
Total Prize Money 10K  -.142503     (4.37) 
Adj.
2R                         0.1306 
F value                        19.07 
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Test of Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 will address the relationship between outcome and players’ ranking 
levels. Less competition is expected to be seen when ranking difference gets wider. 
Replacing ranking difference for top ranking and bottom ranking into equation (17) 
yields: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8
arg 10
tb i i i
i i i
i i i tb
Outcome ClayCourt GrassCourt CarpetCourt
M inalPayoff k Sets TopRankingGS
BottomRankingGS RankingDifference
   
  
  
   
  
  
        (18) 
where 
iRankingDifference is the absolute difference between iTopRanking and 
iBottomRanking in match i. Regression on tournament level is represented by table XXIII. 
 
Table XXIII. Marginal effects after logit regression on RANKING DIFFERENCE for the 
2007-09 ATP Tour. Dependent variable= OUTCOME. Absolute z values in parenthesis.  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
                                                          
5
 This is the only case where Marginal Payoff 10k shows a positive coefficient sign. 
Variable (1) 
Clay Court .0047745         (0.33)  
Grass Court .0027262         (0.13) 
Carpet Court -.0654743       (0.75) 
Marginal Payoff 10k
5
 .00154           (1.67) 
Sets .0638548         (3.64) 
Ranking Difference .0004622         (6.32) 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
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 From table XXIII I conclude that a spot increase in ranking difference decreases 
the number of upsets by .04% only. For example, a 10 spot increase in ranking difference 
decreases the number of upsets by a small amount of .4%. I can also conclude that for 
this model, variables iTopRanking  and iBottomRanking  are more efficient measures than 
iRankingDifference  variable. Coefficient arg iM inalPayoff  became positive but not 
insignificant after ranking difference was added to the new regression. An increase of 
$10,000 in marginal payoff would increase defeats by .1%, which is extremely small. 
Variables iClayCourt and iGrassCourt  became insignificant. The effect of iSets on 
outcome became stronger. Matches played in best of 3 sets continue to have a higher 
frequency of upsets, but now instead of about 8% more, is just 6% more when compared 
to matches played best of 5 sets. For curiosity, I decided to see what happens to outcome 
when we divide rankings, and better from weaker players in subgroups. So, I generated 
new variables in STATA that separated players and rankings as:   
 
 Better players ranked in the top 10 versus worse players also ranked in 
the top 10 
 Better players ranked in the top 10 versus worse players ranked in the 
top 11 to 24 
 Better players ranked in the top 10 versus worse players ranked in the 
top 25 to 49  
 Better players ranked in the top 10 versus worse players ranked in the 
top 50 to 74  
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 Better players ranked in the top 10 versus worse players ranked in the 
top 75 to 100  
 Better players ranked in the top 10 versus worse players ranked worse 
than 100  
 
 Better players ranked in the top 11 to 24 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 11 to 24 
 Better players ranked in the top 11 to 24 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 25 to 49 
 Better players ranked in the top 11 to 24 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 50 to 74 
 Better players ranked in the top 11 to 24 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 75 to 100 
 Better players ranked in the top 11 to 24 versus worse players ranked 
worse than 100  
 
 Better players ranked in the top 24 to 49 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 24 to 49 
 Better players ranked in the top 24 to 49 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 50 to 74 
 Better players ranked in the top 24 to 49 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 75 to 100 
46 
 
 Better players ranked in the top 24 to 49 versus worse players ranked 
worse than 100 
 Better players ranked in the top 50 to 74 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 50 to 74 
 Better players ranked in the top 50 to 74 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 75 to 100 
 Better players ranked in the top 50 to 74 versus worse players ranked 
worse than 100 
 
 Better players ranked in the top 75 to 100 versus worse players ranked 
in the top 75 to 100 
 
 Better players ranked in the top 75 to 100 versus worse players ranked 
worse than 100. 
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Adding all new variables into equation (18) gives: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
8 9 10
11 12 13
arg 10 10 10 10 25
10 50 10 75 10 100
10 100 25 25
tb i i i
i i
Outcome ClayCourt GrassCourt CarpetCourt
M inalPayoff k Sets Top vsBot Top vsBot
Top vsBot Top vsBot Top vsBot
Top vsBot Top vsBot To
   
   
  
  
   
   
  
   
14 15 16
17 18 19
20 21 22
23 24
25
25 50
25 75 25 100 25 100
50 50 50 50 50 75
50 100 50 100 75 75
75 100 75 100
p vsBot
Top vsBot Top vsBot Top vsBot
Top vsBot Top vsBot Top vsBot
Top vsBot Top vsBot Top vsBot
Top vsBot Top vsBot
T
  
  
  
 

   
  
   
  
 26
27
100 100 100 100
100 100 tb
op vsBot Top vsBot
Top vsBot

 
 
   
     (19)    
 
where, 10 10Top vsBot is when better players ranked in the top 10 play against worse 
players also ranked in the top 10. 10 25Top vsBot  is when better players ranked in the top 
10 play against worse players ranked between 11 to 25. 10 50Top vsBot is when better 
players ranked in the top 10 playing against worse players ranked between  26 to 50.
10 75Top vsBot  variable stands for better players ranked in the top 10 versus worse 
players ranked between  51 to 75. 10 100Top vsBot  variable stands for better players 
ranked in the top 10 versus worse players ranked between 76 to 100. 10 100Top vsBot
stands for better players ranked in the top 10 versus worse players ranked poorer than 100.  
25 25Top vsBot  variable stands for better players ranked between 11 to 25 versus worse 
players ranked between 11 to 25 as well. 25 50Top vsBot  is when better players ranked 
between 11 to 25 play against weaker players ranked between  26 to 50. 25 75Top vsBot
variable describes the situation when better players ranked between 11 to 25 play versus 
weaker players ranked between 51 to 75. 25 100Top vsBot  variable describes the situation 
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when better players ranked between 11 to 25 play versus weaker players ranked between 
76 to 101. 25 100Top vsBot  stands for better players ranked between 25 to 50 versus 
worse players ranked poorer than 100. 50 50Top vsBot  variable describes the situation 
when better players ranked between 26 to 50 play versus weaker players also ranked 
between 26 to 50. 50 75Top vsBot variable is explained by matches in which better players 
ranked between 26 to 50 play versus weaker players ranked between 51 to 75.
50 100Top vsBot  variable is explained by matches in which better players ranked between 
26 to 50 play versus weaker players ranked between 76 to 101. 50 100Top vsBot  
variable is explained by matches in which better players ranked between 26 to 50 play 
versus weaker players ranked poorer than 10o. 75 75Top vsBot is when better players 
ranked between 51 to 75 play against worse players also ranked between 51 to 75. 
75 100Top vsBot  is when better players ranked between 51 to 75 play against worse 
players ranked between 76 to 101. 75 100Top vsBot  is when better players ranked 
between 51 to 75 play against worse players ranked poorer than 100. 
100 100Top vsBot  is 
when better players ranked between 76 to 101 play against worse players also ranked 
between 76 to 101. 100 100Top vsBot   is when better players ranked between 76 to 101 
play against worse players ranked poorer than 100. Lastly, 100 100Top vsBot  is when 
better players ranked poorer than 100 play against worse players ranked poorer than 100. 
Regression on players’ ranking subgroup is represented by table XXIV. 
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Table XXIV. Marginal effects after logit regression on PLAYERS’ RANKING 
SUBGROUP for the 2007-09 ATP Tour. Dependent variable= OUTCOME. Absolute z 
values in parenthesis. 
Variable                  (1) 
Clay Court .0120572         (0.83) 
Grass Court .0142309         (0.66) 
Carpet Court -.0683389        (0.77) 
Marginal Payoff 10k -.0026491        (2.26) 
Sets .0563614          (3.03) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 11 to 25 .0815007         (1.75) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 26 to 50 .1089054         (2.45) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 51 to 75 .1580663         (3.83) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 76 to 101 .2113679         (5.65) 
Top 10 versus Bottom  > 100 .2092679         (5.80) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 11 to 25 -.0946906       (1.30) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 26 to 50 -.0484663       (0.83) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 51 to 75 .009893          (0.17) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 75 to 101 .0948124        (1.83) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom  > 100 .1207259        (2.60)  
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom 26 to 50 -.0782457       (1.22) 
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom 51 to 75 -.1055609       (1.71) 
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom 76 to 101 -.0160428       (0.27) 
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Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
 Results in table XXIV show that coefficient for arg iM inalPayoff  became 
negative again, and a $10,000 increase in marginal payoff will increase upsets by 2%. 
Variable iGrassCourt  remained insignificant. The effect of iSets on outcome became 
weaker when compared to table XXIII. Matches played in best of 3 sets continue to have 
a higher frequency of upsets, but now instead of about 6% more, is just 5% more when 
compared to matches played best of 5 sets. Variables 25 75Top vsBot , 50 100Top vsBot and
50 100Top vsBot  are statistically insignificant, meaning that matches played in these 
ranking intervals are considered to be competitive. Variable 
iGrassCourt also became 
insignificant. Coefficient 10 10Top vsBot is the omitted variable in the regression. 
Comparing 10 10Top vsBot  with 10 25Top vsBot I conclude that there are 8% more chances 
for the better player to win if he plays an opponent ranked between 11 to 25 instead of a 
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom  > 100 .0019647        (0.03) 
Top 51 to 75 versus Bottom 51 to 75 -.1664179       (2.36) 
Top 51 to 75 versus Bottom 76 to 101 -.1636106       (2.42) 
Top 51 to 75 versus Bottom  > 100 -.0745935       (1.19) 
Top 76 to 101 versus Bottom 76 to 101 -.1351779       (1.81) 
Top 76 to 101 versus Bottom  > 100 -.106418         (1.65) 
Top > 100  versus Bottom  > 100 -.0977171       (1.49) 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of  dummy variable 1  
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top 10 player. When looking at 10 50Top vsBot  the probability that the top 10 ranked 
better player wins a match against worse player ranked between 26 to 50 increases even 
more, about 11%, when compared to a (better) top 10 player against another (worse) top 
10 player. The probability that the top 10 ranked better player wins a match against a 
worse player ranked between 51 to 75 increases by about 16%, compared to a match 
where both (better and worse ranked) players are ranked in the top 10. The probability 
that the top 10 ranked better player wins a match against a worse player ranked between 
76 to 101 increases by about 21%, compared to a match where both (better and worse 
ranked) players are ranked in the top 10. The probability that the top 10 ranked better 
player wins a match against a worse player ranked poorer than 100 also increases by 
about 21%, compared to a match where both (better and worse ranked)  players are 
ranked in the top 10.  
 The probability that the better player, ranked between 11 to 25 wins a match 
against a worse player, also ranked between 11 to 25 decreases by about 9.5%, compared 
to a match where both (better and worse ranked) players are ranked in the top 10. The 
probability that the better player, ranked between 11 to 25 wins a match against a worse 
player, ranked between 26 to 50 decreases by about 5%, compared to a match where both 
(better and worse ranked)  players are ranked in the top 10. I cannot provide the 
probability that the better player, ranked between 11 to 25 wins a match against a worse 
player, ranked between 51 to 75 because coefficient is statistically insignificant. Hence, I 
can assume such matches are very competitive. The probability that the better player, 
ranked between 11 to 25 wins a match against a worse player, ranked between 76 to 101 
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increases by about 10%, compared to a match where both (better and worse ranked) 
players are ranked in the top 10. The probability that the better player, ranked between 11 
to 25 wins a match against a worse player, ranked poorer than 100 increases by about 
12%, compared to a match where both (better and worse ranked) players are ranked in the 
top 10. 
 The probability that the better player, ranked between 26 to 50 wins a match 
against a worse player, also ranked between 26 to 50 decreases by about 8%, compared to 
a match where both (better and worse ranked)  players are ranked in the top 10. The 
probability that the better player, ranked between 26 to 50 wins a match against a worse 
player,  ranked between 51 to 75 decreases by about 10.5%, compared to a match where 
both (better and worse ranked)  players are ranked in the top 10. I cannot provide the 
probability that the better player, ranked between 26 to 50 wins a match against a worse 
player, ranked between 76 to 101 because coefficient is statistically insignificant. I also 
cannot provide the probability that the better player, ranked between 26 to 50 wins a 
match against a worse player, ranked poorer than 100 because again, coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. Hence, I can assume all these matches are very competitive.  
 The probability that the better player, ranked between 51 to 75 wins a match 
against a worse player,  also ranked between 51 to 75 decreases by about 16%, compared 
to a match where both (better and worse ranked)  players are ranked in the top 10. The 
probability that the better player, ranked between 51 to 75 wins a match against a worse 
player,  ranked between 76 to 101 also decreases by about 16%, compared to a match 
where both (better and worse ranked)  players are ranked in the top 10. The probability 
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that the better player, ranked between 51 to 75 wins a match against a worse player,  
ranked poorer than 100 decreases by about 7%, compared to a match where both (better 
and worse ranked)  players are ranked in the top 10.  
 The probability that the better player, ranked between 76 to 101 wins a match 
against a worse player,  also ranked between 76 to 101 decreases by about 13%, 
compared to a match where both (better and worse ranked)  players are ranked in the top 
10. The probability that the better player, ranked between 76 to 101 wins a match against 
a worse player,  ranked poorer than 100 decreases by about 10%, compared to a match 
where both (better and worse ranked)  players are ranked in the top 10. Finally, The 
probability that the better player, ranked poorer than 100 wins a match against a worse 
player,  also ranked poorer than 100 decreases by about 10%, compared to a match where 
both (better and worse ranked)  players are ranked in the top 10. After observing most of 
results, I can accept the hypothesis that less competition is seen as differences in ranking 
increase. I can also conclude that there is a dominance for the better player ranked in the 
top 10 when compared to the rest of better ranked players. If we observe matches played 
between two top 10 ranked players, and compared with all other matches in which both 
(better and worse ranked) player were in the same ranking subgroup (11 to 25; 26 to 50; 
51 to 75; 76 to 101; and >100) we can see a negative coefficient for such variables, 
meaning that chances for the better player to win a match goes down.  
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CONCLUSION 
 The tournament theory is a hot topic regarding pay structure in professional sports, and at 
the firm level. Many attempted to test Rosen’s model to explain the pay gap for someone who 
was just promoted to a CEO position. In this thesis I’ve mainly investigated if the 
tournament model, developed by Rosen (1986) is applied by tournament directors or 
officials in the ATP World Tour. In order to see if the model is a reality I focused on 
three main issues: (1) are marginal payoffs and prize money levels structured according 
to tournament theory? (2) should the set format of a match influence the number of upsets 
seen? (3) how do spread differences and ranking levels affect the outcome of a match? In 
addition to these questions I observed how winning probabilities changes after the first 
set. 
 The results showed that marginal payoffs are not efficiently developed as Rosen’s 
model predicts. Marginal payoff increases at a decreasing rate every round, and it 
decreases, in percentage terms, in the last round, almost reaching zero at times. The 
distribution of prize per round increases at a constant rate per round, and it mildly 
increases, in percentage terms, in the last round. Both structures of pay contradict the 
model.  
 Changes in the amount of sets played do influence the number of upsets seen in 
tournaments. Results showed that there are more upsets on matches played in best of 3 
sets, when compared to matches played in best of 5 sets. Even though marginal payoffs 
and prize levels are not efficiently structured, a change in spread will influence the 
outcome of a match. An increase in spread difference will increase the number of upsets. 
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I cannot, on the other side, provide an answer that will tell the reader by how much effort 
level changes when there is an increase in spread. It is true to say that as differences in 
ranking increase, less competition is seen. As ranking differences decrease the number of 
upsets increase, and vice-versa happens. Lastly, it is also true to say that there is 
dominance among better players ranked in the top 10 compared to better players in other 
ranking subgroups.  
 This thesis was just a contribution that might help tournament directors reorganize 
prize money distribution, in order to get an optimal result in terms of profits and match 
quality. Better structure in spread could increase players’ performance without increasing 
total purse, which might attract more audience. Perhaps, an interesting area for research 
would be to compare total purse levels with income levels: is tournament purse more 
important for better or worse ranked players? 
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APPENDIX 
Table I. Means, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum values for regression 
variables. (n= 5,279) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Tournament 77.19 40.36 1 129 
Year 2008.45 0.53 2007 2009 
Sets 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Round 1.93 1.16 1 7 
Draw 57.65 37.19 28 128 
Match 19.16 17.16 1 64 
Top Ranking 38.59 36.75 1 557 
Bottom Ranking 116.66 167.52 2 2000 
First Set Winner 0.83 0.46 0 1 
Outcome 0.67 0.46 0 1 
Surface 1.55 0.71 1 4 
Rank Difference 78.05 157.04 0 1999 
Rank Weight 7874.59 4903.08 1869 18797 
Average Ranking Weight 149.41 60.02 45.25 361.42 
Prize Money Breakdown 21956.25 41122.44 1000 800000 
Points 38.01 75.86 0 1200 
Marginal Payoff 61789.85 81530.04 8836.17 850000 
Total Prize Money Singles 2058177 2429653 272280 7547580 
Winners Prize Money 443060.7 475142.1 64000 1600000 
Maximum Rounds 5.642167 0.78 5 7 
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Final 0.024 0.15 0 1 
Semi Final 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Quarter Final 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Top 16 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Top 32 0.38 0.48 0 1 
Top 64 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Top 128 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Hard Court 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Clay Court 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Grass Court 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Carpet Court 0.005 0.07 0 1 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table II. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable MARGINAL PAYOFF, where i(round)= 1, 2,…, 5; DRAW = 28 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Marginal Payoff 1 15300.9 3842.78 10717.5 25073.75 34.01 
Marginal Payoff 2 23186.94 6173.50 15865 39487.5 32.31 
Marginal Payoff 3 34258.25 9379.65 23500 60075 23.48 
Marginal Payoff 4 44774.47 12816.59 30000 79650 -2.17 
Marginal Payoff 5 43822.78 12922.16 30000 78300  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Table III. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable MARGINAL PAYOFFi, where i(round)= 1, 2,…, 5; DRAW = 32 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Marginal Payoff 1 21438 13367.64 11177.5 71300 36.01 
Marginal Payoff 2 33502.48 21838.52 17406.25 118200 33.80 
Marginal Payoff 3 50613.25 34581.17 25412.5 185200 25.78 
Marginal Payoff 4 68200.81 50898.97 32325 255000 0.22 
Marginal Payoff 5 68354.37 53293.57 31450 270000  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table IV. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable MARGINAL PAYOFFi, where i(round)= 1, 2,…, 6; DRAW = 48 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Marginal Payoff 1 25407.04 11202.68 10443.75 47466 48.83 
Marginal Payoff 2 49658.89 23981.07 15987.5 83160 36.17 
Marginal Payoff 3 77799.36 37220.29 23775 121068 33 
Marginal Payoff 4 116119.3 57966.79 33750 182655 30.61 
Marginal Payoff 5 167361.4 82631.06 42000 245430 8.19 
Marginal Payoff 6 182305 76212.16 42500 245430  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table V. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable MARGINAL PAYOFFi, where i(round)= 1, 2,…, 5; DRAW = 56 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Marginal Payoff 1 38201.96 17123.73 8836.172 69153.75 45.48 
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Marginal Payoff 2 70082.11 27244.06 19954.69 115762.5 36.25 
Marginal Payoff 3 109937.1 43511.65 29851.88 187650 33.61 
Marginal Payoff 4 165613.5 67821.27 41343.75 288225 25.72 
Marginal Payoff 5 222985.6 95848.47 51198.75 399600 2.46 
Marginal Payoff 6 228626.8 105682 46912.5 425250  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table VI. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable MARGINAL PAYOFFi, where i(round)= 1, 2,…, 5; DRAW = 96 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Marginal Payoff 1 63337.5 13262.87 55325 86125 38.78 
Marginal Payoff 2 103465 20248.85 91010 138250 35.87 
Marginal Payoff 3 161345 25326.75 145680 204500 31.82 
Marginal Payoff 4 236650 24377.53 221500 277500 19.59 
Marginal Payoff 5 294325 10875.23 277500 302400 3.5 
Marginal Payoff 6 305000 8660.25 295000 310000  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table VII. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable MARGINAL PAYOFFi, where i(round)= 1, 2,…, 5; DRAW = 128 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Marginal Payoff 1 35021.93 3405.09 29942.69 39250 70.27 
Marginal Payoff 2 117815.5 11289.03 100982.8 133000 40.92 
Marginal Payoff 3 199443.4 21138 168155.9 232000 39.65 
Marginal Payoff 4 330496.5 37310.14 281822.2 390000 34.03 
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Marginal Payoff 5 501041.3 60939.01 422730 600000 26.26 
Marginal Payoff 6 679492.5 101641.1 563640 850000 -2.75 
Marginal Payoff 7 661305 85780.53 563640 800000  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table VIII. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWNi, where i(prize)= 1, 2,…, 5; DRAW = 28 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Prize 1 5094.95 1078.97 3600 8750 42.11 
Prize 2 8802.38 1864.032 6385 14760 40.76 
Prize 3 14860.21 3340.693 10500 25150 44.40 
Prize 4 26731.22 6302.35 19000 43750 46.1 
Prize 5 49594.31 12868.1 34000 81000 46.91 
Prize 6 93417.08 25730.98 64000 159300  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table IX. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWNi, where i(prize)= 1, 2,…, 5; DRAW = 32 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Prize 1 6094.783 2396 1000 14500 43.47 
Prize 2 10781.54 4506.25 6350 26700 43.18 
Prize 3 18977.39 9061.16 10600 52300 46.52 
Prize 4 35490.24 19621.05 5550 110000 48.94 
Prize 5 69513.87 42227.2 37000 230000 49.57 
Prize 6 137868.2 95031.14 68800 500000  
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Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table X. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWNi, where i(prize)= 1, 2,…, 6; DRAW = 48 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Prize 1 7311.95 4678.05 3550 20250 34.08 
Prize 2 11093.21 5005.56 6000 20452.5 49.23 
Prize 3 21852.43 9434.10 10100 33034.5 47.46 
Prize 4 41592.14 18177.77 17000 62775 43.81 
Prize 5 74030.71 45179.32 5550 122715 76.83 
Prize 6 319522.9 159940 94000 490860 9.66 
Prize 7 353693.3 152849.5 94000 490860  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table XI. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWNi, where i(prize)= 1, 2,…, 6; DRAW = 56 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Prize 1 10836.18 5266.68 3915 20250 26.14 
Prize 2 14672.08 5465.57 7425 23625 50.74 
Prize 3 29785.67 9758.65 12825 45562.5 47.66 
Prize 4 56916 19589.45 22005 89100 48.74 
Prize 5 111036.7 40205.86 37395 177525 49.46 
Prize 6 219708.8 85769.72 64800 364500 50.99 
Prize 7 448335.7 191104.7 113805 789750  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Table XII. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWNi, where i(prize)= 1, 2,…, 6; DRAW = 96 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Prize 1 13395 3862.14 10580 20000 46.42 
Prize 2 25000 6992.78 20400 37000 47.69 
Prize 3 47792.5 14795.23 38570 73000 47.37 
Prize 4 90812.5 28596.84 73500 138750 49.63 
Prize 5 180300 59993.71 147500 277500 38.95 
Prize 6 295333.3 288.67 295000 295500 50.8 
Prize 7 600333.3 8948.92 590000 605500  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table XIII. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWNi, where i(prize)= 1, 2,…, 7; DRAW = 128 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Percentage Change 
Prize 1 17894.09 1489.86 15682.5 20250 38.36 
Prize 2 29030.21 2658.78 26010 33075 38.39 
Prize 3 47123.97 4279.53 43031.25 54810 42.05 
Prize 4 81319.1 6942.95 70452.8 92340 49.58 
Prize 5 161295 14617.34 140910 178875 50 
Prize 6 322590 29717.93 281820 357750 51.95 
Prize 7 671430 86937.21 563640 800000 49.62 
Prize 8 1332735 170330.9 1127280 1600000  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Table XIV. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWNi, where i(prize)= 1, 2,…, 5; DRAW = 48 and 
YEAR = 2008 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Percentage Change 
Prize 1 5650 352.76 5300 6000 48.63 
Prize 2 11000 0 11000 11000 41.25 
Prize 3 18725 1363.03 17450 20000 43.25 
Prize 4 33000 4618.80 29000 37000 45.45 
Prize 5 60500 12020.82 52000 69000 47.16 
Prize 6 114500 28991.38 94000 135000  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table XV. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWNi, where i= 1, 2,…, 6; DRAW = 48 and YEAR 
= 2008 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Percentage Change 
Prize 1 5181.25 1977.6 3550 8500 43.6 
Prize 2 9187.5 4185.89 6000 16250 72.03 
Prize 3 32852.25 188.22 32670 33034.5 47.38 
Prize 4 62437.5 360.80 62100 62775 48.86 
Prize 5 122107.5 701.48 121500 122715 50 
Prize 6 244215 1718.26 243000 245430 50 
Prize7 488430 3436.53 486000 490860  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Table XVI. Means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum, and percent change for 
variable PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWNi, where i= 1, 2,…, 6; DRAW = 48 and YEAR 
= 2009 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Percentage Change 
Prize 1 5181.25 1977.6 3550 8500 43.6 
Prize 2 9187.5 4185.89 6000 16250 46.37 
Prize 3 17134.38 8337.79 10100 31000 48.57 
Prize 4 33317.5 16308.87 17000 59200 37.57 
Prize 5 53375 43694.24 5550 113725 60.45 
Prize 6 134975 69884.21 51500 222000 52.85 
Prize7 286325 144153.9 94000 443500  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table XVII. Means, TOTAL PRIZE MONEY SINGLES, and % OF TOTAL PRIZE 
MONEY SINGLES, where DRAW = 28, 32, 48, 56, 96, and 128. 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
Winner Prize 28 93417.08 Winner Prize 32 137868.2 
Finalist Prize 28 49594.31 Finalist Prize 32 69513.87 
Semi Prize 28 26731.22 Semi Prize 32 35490.24 
Total Purse 28 387473.3 Total Purse 32 538041 
% Total Purse 43.8 % Total Purse 45.140112 
Variable Mean Variable Mean 
Winner Prize 48 353693.3 Winner Prize 56 448335.7 
Finalist Prize 48 319522.9 Finalist Prize 56 219708.8 
Semi Prize 48 74030.71 Semi Prize 56 111036.7 
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Total Purse 48 1485727 Total Purse 56 1850889 
% Total Purse 50.29 % Total Purse 42.09 
Variable Mean     Variable Mean 
Winner Prize 96 600333.3 Winner Prize 128 1332735 
Finalist Prize 96 295333.3 Finalist Prize 128 671430 
Semi Prize 96 180300 Semi Prize 128 322590 
Total Purse 96 2321013 Total Purse 128 6773250 
% Total Purse 46.35 % Total Purse 34.35 
 Avg. % Total Purse 43.67  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table XVIII. Percentages for FIRST SET WINNERi, and OUTCOMEi, where i=0 or 1.  
First Set Winner Outcome Percentage 
1 0 30.62 
1 1 69.38 
0 0 39.32 
0 1 60.68 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table XIX. Percentages for FIRST SET WINNERi where i=0 or 1. 
First Set Winner Percentage 
0 19.09 
1 79.64 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Table XX. Percentages for OUTCOMEi where i=0 or 1. 
Outcome Percentage 
0 32.59 
1 67.41 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table XXI. Marginal effects after logit regression on SETS and MARGINAL PAYOFF 
for the 2007-09 ATP Tour. Dependent variable= OUTCOME. Absolute z values in 
parenthesis.  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
Variable (1) 
Top Ranking -.0023286         (9.97) 
Bottom Ranking .0004775          (6.56) 
Clay Court .0115025          (0.80) 
Grass Court .0153684          (0.71) 
Carpet Court -.0898073         (1.01) 
Marginal Payoff 10k -.0020323         (2.06) 
Sets .0827337          (2.67) 
Top Ranking Grand Slam -.0024583         (3.89) 
Bottom Ranking Grand Slam .0008218          (2.54) 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable 
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Table XXII. Effect of total purse on entry into tournaments for the 2007-09 ATP Tour. 
Dependent variable= AVERAGE RANK WEIGHT. Absolute t-statistics in parenthesis.  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
Table XXIII. Marginal effects after logit regression on RANKING DIFFERENCE for the 
2007-09 ATP Tour. Dependent variable= OUTCOME. Absolute z values in parenthesis.  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table XXIV. Marginal effects after logit regression on PLAYERS’ RANKING 
SUBGROUP for the 2007-09 ATP Tour. Dependent variable= OUTCOME Absolute z 
values in parenthesis. 
Variable (1) 
Total Prize Money 10K  -.142503     (4.37) 
Adj.
2R                         0.1306 
F value                        19.07 
Variable (1) 
Clay Court .0047745         (0.33)  
Grass Court .0027262         (0.13) 
Carpet Court -.0654743       (0.75) 
Marginal Payoff 10k .00154            (1.67) 
Sets .0638548         (3.64) 
Ranking Difference .0004622         (6.32) 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
Variable                  (1) 
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Clay Court .0120572         (0.83) 
Grass Court .0142309         (0.66) 
Carpet Court -.0683389        (0.77) 
Marginal Payoff 10k -.0026491        (2.26) 
Sets .0563614          (3.03) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 11 to 25 .0815007         (1.75) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 26 to 50 .1089054         (2.45) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 51 to 75 .1580663         (3.83) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 76 to 101 .2113679         (5.65) 
Top 10 versus Bottom  > 100 .2092679         (5.80) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 11 to 25 -.0946906       (1.30) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 26 to 50 -.0484663       (0.83) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 51 to 75 .009893          (0.17) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 75 to 101 .0948124        (1.83) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom  > 100 .1207259        (2.60)  
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom 26 to 50 -.0782457       (1.22) 
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom 51 to 75 -.1055609       (1.71) 
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom 76 to 101 -.0160428       (0.27) 
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom  > 100 .0019647        (0.03) 
Top 51 to 75 versus Bottom 51 to 75 -.1664179       (2.36) 
Top 51 to 75 versus Bottom 76 to 101 -.1636106       (2.42) 
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Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Table XXV. Logit regression on SETS and MARGINAL PAYOFF for the 2007-09 ATP 
Tour. Dependent variable= OUTCOME. Absolute z values in parenthesis.  
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
 
Top 51 to 75 versus Bottom  > 100 -.0745935       (1.19) 
Top 76 to 101 versus Bottom 76 to 101 -.1351779       (1.81) 
Top 76 to 101 versus Bottom  > 100 -.106418         (1.65) 
Top > 100  versus Bottom  > 100 -.0977171       (1.49) 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of  dummy variable 1  
Variable (1) 
Top Ranking -.0107724         (9.93) 
Bottom Ranking .0022088          (6.50) 
Clay Court .0534163          (0.79) 
Grass Court .0718378          (0.71) 
Carpet Court -.3911111         (1.06) 
Marginal Payoff 10k -.0094021         (2.06) 
Sets .402366            (2.52) 
Top Ranking Grand Slam -.0113726         (3.88) 
Bottom Ranking Grand Slam . 0038017         (2.53) 
_cons |    .8835156          (13.41) 
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Table XXVI. Logit regression on RANKING DIFFERENCE for the 2007-09 ATP Tour. 
Dependent variable= OUTCOME. Absolute z values in parenthesis. 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
 
Table XXVII. Logit regression on PLAYERS’ RANKING SUBGROUP for the 2007-09 
ATP Tour. Dependent variable= OUTCOME Absolute z values in parenthesis. 
Variable (1) 
Clay Court .0219219         (0.33)  
Grass Court .01252             (0.13) 
Carpet Court -.2869899       (0.78) 
Marginal Payoff 10k .00706             (1.66) 
Sets .3034473         (3.50) 
Ranking Difference .0021189         (6.26) 
_cons |    .4750604         (9.13) 
Variable                  (1) 
Clay Court .0561957        (0.83) 
Grass Court .0667021         (0.66) 
Carpet Court -.3019814       (0.80) 
Marginal Payoff 10k -.0122967       (2.26) 
Sets .2703712        (2.92) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 11 to 25 .4092022         (1.60) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 26 to 50 .5627051         (2.15) 
71 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
Top 10 versus Bottom 51 to 75 .8869497         (2.99) 
Top 10 versus Bottom 76 to 101 1.344643         (3.60) 
Top 10 versus Bottom  > 100 1.313771         (3.78) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 11 to 25 -.4128738       (1.36) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 26 to 50 -.2178551       (0.85) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 51 to 75 .0462823        (0.17) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom 75 to 101 .4840822        (1.63) 
Top 11 to 25 versus Bottom  > 100 .6350616        (2.23)  
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom 26 to 50 -.3450121       (1.27) 
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom 51 to 75 -.4613496       (1.79) 
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom 76 to 101 -.0735936       (0.27) 
Top 26 to 50 versus Bottom  > 100 .009133          (0.03) 
Top 51 to 75 versus Bottom 51 to 75 -.706405        (2.48) 
Top 51 to 75 versus Bottom 76 to 101  -.6966676     (2.55) 
Top 51 to 75 versus Bottom  > 100  -.330299      (1.24) 
Top 76 to 101 versus Bottom 76 to 101  -.579212      (1.91) 
Top 76 to 101 versus Bottom  > 100 -.463918       (1.73) 
Top > 100  versus Bottom  > 100  -.4271677    (1.56) 
_cons |    .7952297      (3.28) 
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Figure IX: Percentage Average of Total Purse Distributed to Winners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure X: Pure Strategy Equilibra 
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Figure XI: Mean Leves for MARGINAL PAYOFF when i=ROUND and DRAW= 28 
and 32 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
 
Figure XII: Mean levels for MARGINAL PAYOFF when i=ROUND and DRAW=49, 56, 
96, AND 128  
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Figure XIII: Mean Leves for MARGINAL PAYOFF when i=ROUND and DRAW=28, 
32, 48, 56, 96, and 128  
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
Figure XIV: Mean Levels for PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN when i=PRIZE and 
DRAW=28 and 32 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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Figure XV: Mean Levels for PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN when i= PRIZE and 
DRAW= 48, 56, 96, and 128 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
 
Figure XVI: Mean Levels for PRIZE MONEY BREAKDOWN when i=ROUND, 
DRAW=48 and YEAR=2008, DRAW=48 and YEAR=2009, and DRAW=56, 96, and 
128 
 
Source: Author’s calculations from data gathered on the ATP Tour website, 2010. 
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